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ABSTRACT
Chief Judge Rader’s judicial opinions contribute
significantly to patent infringement jurisprudence. He
writes from a teacher’s perspective, providing context and
a clear lens through which legal issues may be examined.
His deep reverence for the rule of law pervades his
opinions, as he injects a cadre of principles governing his
approach. Each opinion builds a foundation made of
consistency and clarity in upholding the fundamental
purposes underlying the patent grant.
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INTRODUCTION
After leaving active duty from the United States Army Judge
Advocate General’s Corps, I was extraordinarily fortunate to serve
a judicial clerk with the Honorable Randall R. Rader, now Chief
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. Through this invaluable experience, I learned the
importance of developing a cadre of principles for approaching
legal issues, not only analytically, but also in writing text. Building
a foundation of knowledge to draw on and build upon in one’s
written work demonstrates the proper respect for the monumental
responsibility of writing judicial opinions.
Chief Judge Rader’s judicial opinions have many admirable
qualities. Most impressive is his profound belief in the significant
role judicial opinions have in preserving our society’s adherence to
the rule of law. In his opinions there is reverence for the weight of
that responsibility as well as an acute awareness of the importance
of clarity. His strong conviction to create a consistent body of work
that provides public notice of the state of the law is admirable and
principled.
As George Harrison said in his song, “Any Road,” “[i]f you do
not know where you are going, any road will take you there.” 1
1

GEORGE HARRISON, Any Road, on BRAINWASHED (Dark Horse 2003).
This refrain is considered a paraphrase of a conversation between Alice and
Cheshire Cat in LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 89
(Macmillian Company 1897) (1865).
"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"
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When drafting judicial opinions, it is important both to understand
and to provide context. Consequently, as a judge you must know
where you have been and why. You must also know where you are
and how you got there. Finally, you must know where you want to
go, why you want to go there, and the best way to get there. Judges
must develop an approach to examine complicated legal issues that
informs a direction consistent with where one wants to take the
law, and at the same time, remains faithful to precedent. Although
this may seem apparent to experts in exegesis (the critical
interpretation of text), when drafting judicial opinions there is
often a temptation to address issues haphazardly without regard for
the negative impact clumsiness in word choice or rationale can
have on judicial opinions.
Although Chief Judge Rader maintains the aforementioned
characteristics in his opinions in all different areas of law, I only
focus on his contributions in a sampling of patent infringement
cases in this presentation. In reviewing patent infringement
judgments, Chief Judge Rader’s judicial opinions demonstrate
consistency, clarity, predictability, and public notice as optimal
qualities. Generally, recognizing the fundamental purpose
underlying the patent grant and how it informs the outcome of the
judgment is the primary consideration. Likewise, Chief Judge
Radar acknowledges the role of the judiciary and how it differs
from the Congressional role in the background of his opinions; it is
as powerful as the undertow that pushes seaward.
Not only is Chief Judge Rader’s writing ideology conducive to
scripting judicial opinions, it also benefits teachers who can use his
opinions as “signposts on the road.” Chief Judge Rader, a professor
himself, provides context and history in every opinion. He creates
a map of where we have been that helps us better understand where
we are going and why. His opinions are unique because he always
pulls everything together in one opinion so it all fits on one map.
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat.
"I don’t much care where--" said Alice.
"Then it doesn’t matter which way you go," said the Cat.
"--so long as I get somewhere," Alice added as an explanation.
"Oh, you’re sure to do that," said the Cat, "if you only walk long
enough."
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Below is a sampling of the patent infringement cases where the
aforementioned principles informed Chief Judge Rader’s judicial
opinions.
I. AT&T CORP. V. MICROSOFT CORP. 2
AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. raised issues regarding the
extraterritoriality of the patent laws reminiscent of those addressed
decades earlier in Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp. 3
To circumvent the patent laws, the defendant in Deepsouth sold
components of a shrimp deveiner abroad that, if sold in
combination in the United States, would have been a direct
infringement under § 271(a). 4 The defendant’s intent was for the
components to be combined abroad, as they could be easily
assembled in less than an hour. 5 The issue concerned whether the
defendant, while barred from the American market because of the
plaintiff’s patents, was “also foreclosed . . . from exporting its
deveiners, in less than fully assembled form, for use abroad.” 6 The
Supreme Court held the patent laws “make[] no claim to
extraterritorial effect; ‘these acts of Congress do not, and were not
intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United States.’” 7 In
finding that the patent laws are explicitly limited to national
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court signaled to Congress that only the
legislature has the authority to grant extraterritorial jurisdiction of
the patent laws. 8 In response to Deepsouth, Congress enacted
§ 271(f), which expanded the territorial reach of U.S. patent laws. 9
2

414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
3
406 U.S. 518 (1972).
4
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
5
Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 524.
6
Id. at 519.
7
Id. at 531 (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856)).
8
Id. at 530.
9
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (“describing Section 271(f) as a response to the ‘Deepsouth
decision which interpreted the patent law not to make it infringement where the
final assembly and sale is abroad’”) (quoting Patent Law Amendments of 1984,
S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 2-3 (1984). The section states:
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Decades later, in AT&T, the Federal Circuit faced a challenge
to the extraterritorial reach of § 271(f). In that case, AT&T’s
patents covered an apparatus for digitally encoding and
compressing recorded speech. Microsoft incorporated potentially
infringing software into its Windows operating system. To avoid
infringement on a massive scale, Microsoft sent its foreign
licensees master versions of its Windows software, either via
“golden master” disks or electronic transmission, for replication
abroad. 10 AT&T sued for patent infringement. Microsoft defended
by contending that liability does not attach unless a master disk or
electronic transmission sent from the United States is in fact
incorporated into a foreign-assembled computer abroad, which did
not occur. In order to resolve this dispute, the Federal Circuit
addressed two issues:
(1) May software be a component of a patented
invention under 271(f), 11 and
(2) Are copies of software replicated abroad from a
master version exported from the United States—
with the intent that it be replicated—deemed

(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or
from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of
a patented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole
or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such
components outside of the United States in a manner that would
infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United
States, shall be liable as an infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or
from the United States any component of a patented invention that is
especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined in whole or in
part, knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending
that such component will be combined outside of the United States in a
manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred
within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (emphasis added).
10
AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
11
Id. at 1369.
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supplied for purposes of 271(f)? 12
To answer the first question, the court looked to a prior Rader
opinion written a few months earlier, Eolas Technologies Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp. 13 That case held that software code qualifies as a
patent eligible invention and that § 271(f) does not limit its
language to patented machines or structures. Thus, software may
be a component of a patented invention for purposes of § 271(f). 14
But unlike the combination in Eolas, where the actual disks
exported were incorporated into the foreign computers, in AT&T
only copies made abroad of the exported Windows software were
installed on foreign-assembled computers. 15 These computers were
then sold to foreign customers, not domestic ones. Nevertheless,
the Federal Circuit, with Judge Rader in dissent, found the “act of
copying is subsumed in the act of ‘supplying,’ [and sending one
copy abroad] with the intent that it be replicated invokes § 271(f)
liability . . . . ”16
Judge Rader dissented, recognizing that the panel’s definition
of supplying a component would give “rise to endless liability in
the United States under § 271(f) for products manufactured
entirely abroad.” 17 He also disagreed with the majority because the
ease of copying was “not the proper basis for making distinctions
under § 271(f).” 18 Referring to his prior opinion in Eolas, 19 Judge
Rader cited to the TRIPs20 Agreement, which states generally that
patent rights shall be enjoyed without discrimination as to the field

12

Id.
Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
14
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1369 (citing Eolas Techs. Inc., 399 F.3d at
1339).
15
Id. at 1369.
16
Id. at 1370.
17
Id. at 1372 (Rader, J., dissenting).
18
Id. at 1374.
19
Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1339.
20
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999),
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs].
13
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of technology. 21 In contrast, the majority treated software
inventions differently from other subject matter, contravening both
precedent and TRIPs. Appropriately, to address the conflict in
precedent and the jeopardized path to predictability, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari and resolved the inconsistency by
reversing the Federal Circuit, citing to Judge Rader’s dissent in the
process. 22
The Court agreed with Judge Rader, noting that “nothing in
§ 271(f)’s text . . . renders ease of copying a relevant . . . factor in
triggering liability for infringement.”23 Further agreeing, the Court
stated that Congress is no doubt aware how easy it is to copy
software and any change in the law should be made after careful
legislative deliberation, “and not by the [j]udiciary forecasting
Congress’ likely disposition.” 24 Just like in Deepsouth, 25 the
Supreme Court signaled to Congress to change the fundamentals of
the law, as is its role.
II. BMC RESOURCES, INC. V. PAYMENTECH, LP26
BMC appealed a summary judgment finding of noninfringement of two of its patents on a method for processing debit
transactions without a personal identification number (PIN). 27 The
trial court found that Paymentech, the alleged infringer, had
performed some, but not all, of the steps in the averred method
claims. 28 Instead, other parties performed the remainder of the
claimed method steps. 29 This case presented the opportunity to
21

TRIPs, Part II, § 5 (“Patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable
without discrimination as to the place of invention . . . [and] the field of
technology”).
22
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 453 (2007).
23
Id.
24
Id. at 459.
25
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972)
(“[T]he sign of how far Congress has chosen to go [regarding the infringement
of combination patents abroad] can come only from Congress.”).
26
498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
27
Id. at 1375.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 1378.
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address the requirements for proving direct or indirect
infringement of a method claim, when no one party performs all
the steps of the patented method invention. To address this
question, two issues had to be resolved: first, whether direct
infringement of method claims requires each step in the claim to be
performed, and second, whether vicarious liability for the acts of
other parties requires control over of the conduct of the other
parties. 30
The case law on whether each step of a method claim must be
performed for direct infringement liability is a well-settled issue:
“[Direct] infringement occurs when a party performs all of the
steps of the process.” 31 The standards for vicarious liability,
however, had been apparently muddied by an earlier Federal
Circuit case, On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Industries,
Inc. 32 By not directly analyzing the infringement, the On Demand
court ostensibly affirmed a jury instruction that was perceived as
an inaccurate description of Federal Circuit precedent by BMC. 33
On Demand could be interpreted as conceding that joint
infringers are jointly liable for infringement in cases where neither
infringer performs all of the claimed steps. Consequently, to show
30

See id. at 1379-80.
Id. at 1379 (citing Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
32
On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
33
The language in On Demand, reads:
31

It is not necessary for the acts that constitute infringement to
be performed by one person or entity. When infringement
results from the participation and combined action(s) of more
than one person or entity, they are all joint infringers and
jointly liable for patent infringement. Infringement of a
patented process or method cannot be avoided by having
another perform one step of the process or method. Where the
infringement is the result of the participation and combined
action(s) of one or more persons or entities, they are joint
infringers and are jointly liable for the infringement.
On Demand, 442 F.3d at 1344-45; see also BMC, 498 F.3d at 1379-80 (stating
the court merely discerned no flaw in the instructions above as a statement of
law, but did so without any analysis of the issues related to divided
infringement).
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vicarious liability, there would be no requirement for one infringer
to have control over the other. Judge Rader writes for the court in
BMC, dispelling this misconception and clearly articulating the
following standards:
(1) “Infringement requires, as it always has, a
showing that a defendant has practiced each and
every element of the claimed invention.” 34
(2) Where a party is engaged in indirect
infringement, “this court has held that inducement
of infringement requires a predicate finding of
direct infringement.”35
(3) “A party cannot avoid infringement . . . simply
by contracting out steps of a patented process to
another entity. . . . The party in control [is] liable for
direct infringement.”36
In other words, regarding points one and two, properly
pleading an act of indirect infringement, including either active
inducement infringement under § 271(b) 37 or contributory
infringement under § 271(c), 38 requires alleging an act of direct
infringement. Rather than merely stating this point like prior cases
have, Judge Rader explains why this requirement exists by
exploring the statutory scheme for indirect infringement. Because
“[d]irect infringement is a strict-liability offense, . . . it is limited to
those who practice each and every element of the claimed
invention.” 39 On the other hand, active inducement infringement is
not a strict liability offense. Instead, active inducement requires
showing specific intent to induce infringement, yet it does not call
for each and every element of the claimed invention to be infringed
by the inducer. Similarly, contributory infringement, also not a
34

BMC, 498 F.3d at 1380 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton-Davis
Chem. Corp., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997)).
35
Id. (citing Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263,
1272 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
36
Id. at 1381.
37
35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
38
35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
39
BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381.
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strict-liability offense, requires knowledge of sales of components
or materials without having substantial non-infringing uses. 40 In
adhering to and discussing the purpose behind § 271(a) versus
indirect infringement under § 271(c), the court addresses strict
liability versus the knowledge or intent requirements.41
BMC is a wonderful case to use when teaching about patent
enforcement litigation. It is often difficult to explain to students
how to properly plead a claim of contributory infringement
because, to plead correctly, one must allege one act of direct
infringement.
III. DSU MEDICAL CORP. V. JMS CO.42
The en banc court in DSU looked at the Supreme Court opinion
in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 43 where the Court
established the standard for active inducement infringement in
copyright cases and resolved conflicting precedent. 44 As with
previous Supreme Court cases over the last decade and a half, the
Court signaled its disapproval for carving out special rules that
treat patent cases differently when precedent incorporates
traditional notions of equity, intent, and willfulness. 45
40

Id.
Id.; see Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (opinion written by Judge Rader states that 271(f)(2) only requires
intent that components will be combined abroad and that it does not incorporate
the doctrine of contributory infringement). Although an act of direct
infringement need not be alleged, 271(f)(2) is not a strict liability standard.
Intent is required. Thus, when not infringing each and every element of the
invention, knowledge or intent is required, as BMC advises. See BMC, 498 F.3d
at 1381.
42
471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
43
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005).
44
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934-36 (requiring active steps in encouraging
infringement to prove inducement).
45
See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 56-59 (2007) (setting
forth a general standard for willfulness includes recklessness); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006) (traditional notions of
equity should be applied to decisions to grant permanent injunctions); MGM
Studios, 545 U.S. at 934-36. See generally MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
41
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In order to incorporate these longstanding principles, Judge
Rader, writing for the court, resolved conflicting precedent
regarding the requirements for proving active inducement
infringement. 46 Although DSU is a panel opinion, it has an en banc
component, Section III. B. It addressed the requirement in
Grokster that inducement includes active steps encouraging
infringement. 47
In DSU, Judge Rader addressed three guiding principles or
rules resolving conflicting precedent involving required intent for
proving active inducement infringement:
(1) To prove inducement, the plaintiff has the
burden of showing the alleged infringer “knew or
should have known his actions would induce actual
infringement.” 48
(2) Proving inducement necessarily requires
showing that the alleged infringer knew of the
patent.49
(3) Plaintiff must prove that once the alleged
infringers “knew of the patent, they ‘actively and
knowingly aid[ed] and abett[ed] another’s direct
infringement.’” 50 In other words, “specific intent
and action to induce infringement” 51 is required;
mere “‘knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute
infringement’ is not enough.” 52
Although DSU finally clarified Federal Circuit precedent, in

549 U.S. 118 (2007).
46
DSU, 471 F.3d at 1305.
47
Id. at 1304-06 (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934-36).
48
Id. at 1304.
49
Id. (citing Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354,
1364 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
50
Id. (quoting Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed.
Cir. 1988)) (modifications in original).
51
Id.
52
DSU, 471 F.3d at 1305. (quoting Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp.,
316 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
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Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 53 the Supreme Court
clarified the knowledge threshold required to prove active
inducement infringement. The Court recognized that both the
language in 271(b) and the pre-1952 case law were “susceptible to
conflicting interpretations” of the intent required to show
inducement. 54 The Court held that the same knowledge needed to
show contributory infringement was required for active
inducement infringement. 55 The Court adopted the “willful
blindness” standard in criminal law as the required proof that the
alleged infringer acted knowingly and willfully to induce
infringement. 56
The Court noted that “willful blindness” is a
concept holding defendants who “deliberately
shield[] themselves from clear evidence” as
criminally liable “as those who have actual
knowledge.” 57 The Court stated that “willful
blindness” has two basic requirements: (1) the
defendant must subjectively believe that there is a
high probability that a fact exists and (2) the
defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid
learning of that fact. 58
The Court clarifies that “willful blindness” is more limited in
scope than recklessness or negligence. With “willful blindness,” it
is almost as if the defendant actually knew of the wrongdoing;
“[b]y contrast, a reckless defendant is one who merely knows of a
substantial and unjustified risk of such wrongdoing . . . .”59
The Supreme Court’s test departs from the Federal Circuit’s
test in two ways. First, the Federal Circuit permits a finding of
53

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
Id. at 2067.
55
Id. at 2068 (noting 271(b) and 271(c) “have a common origin in the pre1952 understanding of contributory infringement,” and thus both should have
same meaning).
56
Id. at 2068-69.
57
Id. at 2069 (citing J. LI. J. Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge,
17 MOD. L. REV. 294, 302 (1954)).
58
Global-Tech. Appliances, 131 S. Ct. at 2070.
59
Id. at 2071.
54
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knowledge when there is merely a “‘known risk’ that the induced
acts are infringing.” 60 Second, the Federal Circuit’s test “does not
require active efforts by the inducer to avoid knowing about the
infringing nature of the activities.” 61
IV. JOHNSON & JOHNSTON ASSOCS. INC. V.
R.E. SERVICE CO., INC. 62
The Federal Circuit case Johnson & Johnston Associates Inc. v.
R.E. Service Co., Inc. involves the patentee’s invention for an
assembly tool that prevents damage to thin sheets of copper foil
that are used in making circuit boards as workers manually handle
the sheets during the layering process. The invention is a stiff
substrate that adheres to the fragile copper foil, thereby protecting
it from damage. 63 The patent specification discloses aluminum as
the preferred substrate, but also lists other metals, such as stainless
steel or nickel alloys. 64 Although the patent discloses the use of
other metals, it does not claim their use, instead only claiming
aluminum. 65 RES, a competitor, instead of using aluminum as a
substrate, used steel. The patentee sued RES for patent
infringement. RES cited Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc. 66 as a
foundation for its argument that the steel substrate is dedicated to
the public because the patentee disclosed but did not claim steel.
Maxwell prohibits expanding claim scope in a non-textual
infringement analysis to cover material disclosed, but not
claimed. 67 The patentee disagreed, citing YBM Magnex, Inc. v.
International Trade Commission, 68 where a similar magnet alloy
60

Id.
Id.
62
285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc).
63
Id. at 1049.
64
Id. at 1050.
65
Id. at 1051.
66
86 F.3d 1098, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding “subject matter disclosed
but not claimed in a patent application is dedicated to the public”) (quoting
Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
67
Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1106.
68
YBM Magnex, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 145 F.3d 1317, 1321 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (limiting Maxwell to instances where an unclaimed alternative is
61
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differed from the claimed alloy in its oxygen content. 69 YBX limits
Maxwell to cases where an unclaimed alternative is disclosed and
is distinct from the claimed invention. YBX also affirmatively
states Maxwell “did not create a new rule of law that doctrine of
equivalents could never encompass subject matter disclosed in the
specification but not claimed.” 70
To resolve the conflict in precedent, the Federal Circuit took
Johnson en banc and held that “when a patent drafter discloses but
declines to claim subject matter,” 71 the unclaimed subject matter is
dedicated to the public. The court also overruled any portion of
YBX that was inconsistent with its ruling in Johnson. 72 Judge
Rader wrote separately to further identify and clarify the
competing interests involved when unclaimed alternatives are
disclosed in a patent.
Judge Rader’s concurrence, in which then-Chief Judge Mayer
joined, articulates the crucial public and notice function of patent
claims that the Supreme Court describes in Warner-Jenkinson Co.
v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. 73 In his concurrence, Judge Rader
reconciles the “preeminent notice function of patent claims with
the protective function of the doctrine of equivalents.”74
He emphasizes that the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents
is to prevent the unscrupulous copyist from escaping
infringement. 75 The doctrine of equivalents, however, must be
balanced as to not upset the notice function of claim language. The
patentee should be prevented from capturing equivalents the
“drafter reasonably could have foreseen during the application
process and included in the claims.” 76 Judge Rader mentions that
the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have addressed this conflict
through limiting non-textual infringement to require an equivalent
disclosed that is distinct from the claimed invention).
69
Id. at 1319.
70
Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1051 (citing YBX, 145 F.3d at 1321).
71
Id. at 1054.
72
Id. at 1055.
73
520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
74
Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring).
75
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607
(1950).
76
Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J. concurring).

2012]

CELEBRATING CONTRIBUTIONS OF CHIEF JUDGE RADER
TO PATENT INFRINGEMENT JURISPRUDENCE

441

for each and every element of a patent claim. 77
To further balance these juxtaposed goals, Judge Rader
suggests an additional limitation for analyzing non-textual
infringement. When a skilled artisan “in the relevant art would
foresee coverage of an invention, a patent drafter has an obligation
to claim those foreseeable limits.” 78 In that way, the definitional
and notice function of the claims are further preserved, thereby
encompassing the entire claim scope for all foreseeable
circumstances. 79 In essence, Judge Rader advocates providing a
foreseeability bar as a way to boost the notice function of claims. 80
As he makes this suggestion, he hearkens back to a prior case he
wrote for the court, Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc., 81
which articulates this principle.
V. SAGE PRODUCTS, INC. V. DEVON INDUSTRIES, INC.
In Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc., the patentee
disclosed a disposal container to safely deposit sharp medical
waste without touching the waste already present in the
container. 82 Sage claimed its invention clumsily by requiring “an
elongated slot at the top of the container body for permitting access
to the interior of the container body.” 83 The alleged infringer’s
elongated slot, however, lies within the container body, not on top
of it. 84 Sage therefore could not prove literal infringement and so it
sought to find Devon liable for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. Devon relied on Warner-Jenkinson 85 when it asserted
that “the doctrine of equivalents d[id] not grant Sage license to
77

Id. at 1056-57 (Rader, J. concurring) (citations omitted).
Id. at 1057 (Rader, J. concurring).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
82
Id. at 1422.
83
Id.. (emphasis removed).
84
Id. at 1423.
85
Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29
(“It is important to ensure that the application of the doctrine, even as to an
individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate
that element in its entirety.”).
78
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remove entirely the ‘top of the container’ and ‘over said slot’
limitations from the claim.” 86 Devon’s position was, in effect, that
if a patentee claims narrowly, but could have claimed more
broadly, the doctrine of equivalents should not be a vehicle for
fixing ineptly drafted claim language.
The question to the court, then, was who should bear the risk of
loss as “between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to
negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and the public at
large.” 87 The court stated that the patentee must bear the risk of
loss: 88 “If Sage desired broad patent protection for any container
that performed a function similar to its claimed container, it could
have sought claims with fewer structural encumbrances.” 89 A
premium is placed on forethought in patent drafting. 90
Another important statement in the opinion holds the patent
drafter’s feet to the fire regarding the importance of ensuring that
what is said during prosecution must be consistent with what is
said when arguing for equivalents:
Where a patent claim recites a specific function for
an element of the claim and the written description
reiterates the importance of that particular function,
a patentee may not later argue, during the course of
litigation, that an accused device lacking that
functionality is equivalent. 91
The entire opinion reflects on the public notice function of
claims, which will limit a patentee’s ability to circumvent what it
initially claimed and later obtain broader coverage through
equivalents. In other words, the patent grant is not a carte blanche
to capture patent protection where none was conceived.

86

Sage Prods., 126 F.3d at 1424.
Id. at 1425.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 1429-30 (citing Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d
931, 938 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
87
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VI. ABBOT LABORATORIES V. SANDOZ, INC.92
In Abbot Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., 93 the Federal Circuit, en
banc, clarified the scope of product-by-process claims by adopting
the rule in an earlier Rader opinion, Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v.
Faytex Corp. 94 In that case, Judge Rader, writing for the panel,
criticized the rule in Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v.
Genentech, Inc., 95 which stated “the correct reading of product-byprocess claims is that they are not limited to product prepared by
the process set forth in the claims.” 96 The court justified rejecting
this rule because the rule need not be followed if the court
determines that the prior panel would have reached a different
conclusion if it had considered controlling precedent. 97
Recognizing the need to resolve the conflict in precedent,
Judge Rader, writing for the court, held that the scope of productby-process claims in patent infringement determinations is limited
by the recited process terms, and in so doing finally overruled and
laid to rest Scripps Clinic. 98 The Abbot opinion clarified that
limiting language in the specification will not be read into the
claims unless there is a clear and intentional disavowal of claim
scope.99 But, the proper reading of product-by-process claims
incorporates process limitations in defining claim scope for
infringement purposes. 100

92

566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. (en banc as to the cited issue).
94
970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In that case, Judge Rader, writing for the
panel, criticized the rule in Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech,
Inc., which stated “the correct reading of product-by-process claims is that they
are not limited to product prepared by the process set forth in the claims.”
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583 (Fed.
Cir. 1991), overruled by Abbot Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (en banc).
95
Id. at 1565.
96
Id. at 1583.
97
Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d 838 n. 2.
98
Id. at 838.
99
Abbot Labs., 566 F.3d at 1290.
100
Id. at 1292.
93
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CONCLUSION
Chief Judge Rader’s judicial opinions contribute significantly
to patent infringement jurisprudence. He writes from a teacher’s
perspective, providing context and a clear lens through which legal
issues may be examined. His deep reverence for the rule of law
pervades his opinions, as he injects a cadre of principles governing
his approach. Each opinion builds a foundation made of
consistency and clarity in upholding the fundamental purposes
underlying the patent grant.

